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REPLY REQUIRED 
The "Response" filed by defendants-respondents calls for 
a reply from plaintiff-appellant. 
The additional brief is believed to be completely unwarranted 
and presumptuous, because the case cited to support the proposition 
that the notice of appeal is fatally defective was available at the time 
of preparation of defendants-respondents' appeal brief and is not in 
response to a new issue. Moreover, under the heading "Plaintiff Was 
Not Denied Due Process", the quotation from a transcript of lower 
court proceedings after the appeal was filed and appeal briefs had been 
submitted sheds no new light on the issues in the appeal. It seems clear, 
that both are merely excuses for belated and prolonged argument in a 
transparent attempt to obtain the last word in an otherwise legitimate 
exchange of briefs. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NITT FATALLY DEFECTIVE 
It is submitted that defendants-respondents' reliance on the 
cited case of Walker v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Association, 268 F. 2d 16 (CCA 9th, 1959) is misplaced. If anything 
the case supports plaintiff-appellant's position that this appeal is proper. 
In the first place, the factual situation is very different. 
The plaintiff-appellant in the cited case had pleaded and appeared in 
propria persona and had failed to either establish jurisdiction or state 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a cause of action by the allegations in the original, amended, and 
proposed to be amended complaints. After dismissal of the action, 
she made four motions designed to reinstate the lawsuit. The lower 
court denied these motions. On appeal, the motion to set aside the 
order of dismissal and for leave to file an amended complaint was 
considered by the court to be, in effect, a motion to alter or amend 
the order, under Rule 59(e) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Court reasoned that, since a motion for a new trial gives the trial 
judge power to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, and, if the 
motion is denied, such denial may be reviewed for manifest abuse of 
discretion, the same should be true for a motion to alter or amend. 
It applied this reasoning in the case then at bar and held that, under 
the circumstances, there had been no manifest abuse of discretion. 
It should be noted that the Court held the appeal had been 
timely filed and considered both the merits of the original order of 
dismissal and the merits of the denial of the motion to alter or amend. 
In their main Brief, defendants -respondents have taken the 
position (p. 8) that a request for a new trial is not appealable. Plaintiff-
Appellant has argued that its motion was, in effect, a motion to alter 
or amend the Order of January 24, 1977, holding that royalties are due 
on the Nordell-Kimball cab latch. Whichever way it is viewed, irnplicir 
in this appeal is the proposition that the trial court erred and abused 
any discretion it might have had to grant or deny the motion. 
-2-
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THE APPEAL IS NITT UNTIMELY 
Defendants-Respondents now argue that plaintiff-appellant's 
motion was one for reconsideration of the Amended Decree of July 30, 
1975, which awarded plaintiff-appellant an exclusive license under 
the Brimhall patents for the life of such patents subject to payment of 
a royalty, and that such a motion is untimely. 
This is a completely illogical argument. Plaintiff-Appellant 
did not appeal from that decision favorable to it, did not move for 
reconsideration of that decision, and does not now urge any alteration 
of that decision. 
Neither does plaintiff-appellant seek the introduction of 
new or additional evidence with respect to that decision. Rather, 
defendants -respondents asked the lower court to hold plaintiff-appellant 
in contempt for not paying royalty on a product manufactured under a 
different patent. This appeal arises from the lower court's refusal 
to conform to the requirements of the United States Patent Laws and 
~be 
to accepted practice thereunder by holding royalties,. due under a patent 
and on a product not subjected to proper scrutiny by the Court from the 
standpoint of patent validity and infringement. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
Defendants-Respondents insist that, because the lower court 
had knowledge of the Nordell-Kimball cab latch (the so-called "black 
-3-
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cab latch") prior to entry of the Amended Decree of July 30, 197S 
(which would also be prior to entry of the Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law), it had sufficient facts and details before 
it to justify the finding that royalties are due on such product. 
But, if that had been so, certainly the lower court would 
have made formal findings and conclusions to that effect, which it 
did not do. 
It is submitted that it was improper for defendants -
respondents to ask, and for the lower court to decide, that the Nordell-
Kimball cab latch comes within the scope of its Amended Decree of 
July 30, 1975, without proof that such cab latch comes within the 
scope of and is subject to the licensed Brimhall patents. 
The comments of the trial judge, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, quoted at page S of the so-called "Response" from the trans-
cript of a hearing (September 23, 1977) on several motions brought by 
defendants-respondents, provides no effective support for the decision 
and clearly shows that there was an abuse of discretion with respect 
to denying plaintiff-appellant a proper evidentiary hearing. From 
mere external observation, without reference to Brimhall patent 
description or claims, without benefit of the explanation and differ -
entiation that gained Messrs. Nordell and Kimball a separate patent 
from a presumably skilled and knowledgeable patent examiner, and 
-4-
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without consideration of patent validity, the trial judge decided only 
"that the black cab latch is sufficiently identical with the original cab 
latch that royalties should be paid on it". 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE NITT IMPROPER 
Although the Nordell -Kimball patent is not of record, its 
existence has been recognized by defendants-respondents and is a 
fact to be considered on the appeal. 
As to the matter of asserted resistance to royalty payments, 
plaintiff-appellant stands on its Reply Brief, pages 1 and 2. 
It is true that the transcript of proceedings shows no 
objection being voiced on behalf of plaintiff-appellant. This is due 
to the sudden departure of the court reporter and to the fact that 
defendants-respondents' suggestion for and the resulting discussion 
as to the propriety of the trial judge informally viewing the exhibits 
(which had been set up in the courtroom by defendants-respondents), 
without setting a time for a proper evidentiary hearing, came after 
departure of the court reporter and, indeed, after formal closing 
of the Court. 
ADDENDUM TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Since the filing of plaintiff-appellant's reply brief, the 
decision in Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 579; 192 USPQ 
769 (DCE Wisc. Feb. 24, 1977) (see page 16 of the reply brief) has been 
-5-
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. A copy of the as 
yet unpublished decision is included herein as an appendix. 
It is significant, indeed, to note that the Federal Circuit 
Court affirmed the lower court in its dismissal of the complaint that 
sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and patent invalidity, 
in view of the fact that such complaint was filed by the defendants-
respondents in an action in the State court for royalties due under a 
license agreement, and that the case of Public Service Commission 
of Utah v. Wycoff Company, Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952) was discussed 
(at pages 6 and 7) and its logic was held to control the outcome of the 
case then at bar. 
It is submitted that there can be no question but that the 
lower court in the present case must confront, and not avoid, proper 
application of the patent law as urged by plaintiff-appellant in its main 
Brief, particularly pages 12 -14 thereof. 
Of counsel: 
A. Wally Sandack 
SANDACK & SANDACK 
Respectfully submitted, 
-6-
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APPENDIX 
Jn tfJt 
mniteb ~tates ~ourt of ~ppeais 
No. 77-1049 
MILPRINT, INC., 
Cuawooo, INC., 
~or tflt &tbtntb €ircuit 
Plaintiff-Appella11t, 
v. 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal ·from lhe United Si...1, .. lJi•trict Courl for lhe 
Eu tern Dl~trict or \\' 1scon."'i n. 
No. 76-C-201-John \\'. Keynoh.la, J..d~. 
ARGUED APRIL 19, 1977-DEi:IDt;D SEPTEMBER 14, 1977 
Before PELL, TONE, and Wooo, Circuit Judges. 
PELL, Circuit Judge. Appellee Curwood, Inc., is the 
owner of a patent covering a plastic laminated film 
product. In 1970, Curwood advised appellant Milprint, 
Inc., that it should either take a license under the patent 
or prepare for an infringement suit. By two agreements 
in April 1971 Milprint took a license but reserved its 
right to contest the validity of the patent. In mid-1973, 
Milprint ceased making royalty payments due under the 
license agreement and on March 1. 1976. Curwood 
instituted an action for royalties in the Circuit Court of 
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. Diversity between the 
-7-
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2 No. 77-!r.; 
parties being lacking. the state court, as wil! 
discussed hereinafter, was the only forum availa~:e · 
Curwood. 
On March 22. 1976. Milprint filed in the district c1; 
a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to thee::, 
that Curwood's then-current reissue patent ana 
predecessor were invalid. that no further royalties.,,,. 
due Curwood under the license agreements. and :· 
Milprint was entitled to return of the royalties r: 
between 1971 and 1973. A separate count o(: 
complaint alleged breaches of the agreements 
Curwood and sought similar declarations as to roy•.: 
On April 1, Milprint filed a petition removing the;:: 
court case to the district court. The district er· 
remanded the case because it had been "remo.· 
improvidently and without jurisdiction." 28 U 
§ 1447(c).1 In the same decision and order. the dis:: 
court rejected Curwood's argument that the case s~.c. 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. but noneti:E' 
dismissed the declaratory action b~cause of the ;' 
dency of the state court suit. 
Milprint's appeal attacks only the propriety of· 
district court's discretionary dismissal. and Cur.1:· 
apparently satisfied with a dismissal on any groi;na ~ 
not pressed its jurisdictional objection in this coun · 
objection made in the district court was that M1;rr·J 
declaratory action does not "aris[e) under any .-k 
Congress relating to pa~ents" within the meaning c;·J 
U.S.C. § 1338(a).~ The district court was of the v1< 11 · 
1 By unreported order of February 11, 1977. this r:I 
dismissed ~!ilprint's appeal from this :-emand order l•g' 
of appellate JUrisdict1on. C11nrnod. Inc. I'. J[1/pnn' .. ' 
No. 77-1050. ~ee 28 U.S.C. § 14.;/(dl: Thrn11tron Pr--~ 
Inc. v. Hennansdorfer . .;23 U.S. 336, 343 (1~76). 
1 Section ~338(a) provides: . . . . . . ,.,, 
The d1str1ct courts shall have original iunsd?cuon.: 1 
civil action arisin~ under any Act of Congre;s re'·: .• 
patents. plant variety protection. copyrights anu ·.1 
marks. Such jurisdiction shall be cxclus1n: of the c;:.j 
the states in patent, plant variety protect10n and :c,: 
cases. 
-8-
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No. 77-1049 3 
the action "ma.nifestly does" so arise. Because the matter 
does not seem to us to be so simple. we must first decide 
whether the district court had jurisdiction of the case. 
See· Arv·in Industries, Inc. v. Berns Air King Corpor-
ation, 510 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1975). 
It has long been clear. notwithstanding the substantial 
federal interest in patent matters, that there is no 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over questions arising 
under the patent Jaws; only ca,~es so arising may be 
brought in the federal courts. PrnttT. Paris Gns Liyht & 
Coke Com]Jany. 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897). Consistent with 
the oft-cited lrinciple stated by Justice Holmes in 
American Wei Wurl.:.~ Co. l'. Layne & Boll'ler Co., 241 
U.S 257, 260 (1916) (in which patent jurisdiction was 
asserted). that "[a) suit arises under the Jaw that creates 
the cause of action," it is well established that 
[w]hile a suit for infringement of a patent arises 
under the p_atent Jaws ;rnd is therefore cognizable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). a suit to enforce an 
undertaking to pay royalties for the use of a patent 
arises under state law and is not within the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Albright v. Teas, 
106 U.S. 613 ... (1883); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 
270 U.S. 496, 510 ... (1926). 
Aroin lndustrie.~. supra. 510 F.2d at 1072-73.3 A patent 
licensor whose licensee has broken the agreement is not 
without choice between a state and a federal forum. It 
can, for example. declare the license forfeited for breach 
of a condition subsequent and sue for infringement. If it 
, is correct as to its. right to declare such a forfeiture 
unilaterally (a question of state law) federal jurisdiction 
of the infringement suit exists. Luckett 1·. Delpark, Inc., 
supra, 270 U.S. at 511. But where the licensor stands on 
r • . 
3 Under these principles. there can be no doubt that the 
count of Milprint s complaint which allel!'eS Curwood's breach-
es of the license ag-reemcnt and seeks, thus. a declaration that 
Milprint is entitled to return of already paid royalties. has no 
jurisdictional significance. This count sounds exclusi\'ely in 
contract, and. unlike the other count, does not even assert the 
existence of patent law issues. 
-9-
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4 No. 77:. 
the license agreement and seeks contract remedie<., 
~n. all_eg!ltion of infri.ngement will. not create ft:;, 
JUr1sd1ct10n, for the existence of the license precludt,
1 1><>ssibility of infringement. Arvin lndu.stries, oupr" 
F.2d at 1073. 
These principles lead straight to the conclusion :1 
Curwood's state court royalties suit, diversity t;l 
absent, could have been brought nowhere else bu: j 
state court. Curwood's suit is a prototypal one of a q 
that arises under state, not federal patent .. :I 
Milprint's assertions that the underlying paten•o I 
invalid could be asserted b:t way _of defense in th!'I 
court. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkrns, 39v U.S. 653, 669·,J 
(1969). 
The questions at hand are whether Milprint'sl a· 
does anything more than seek to establish what~ 
be its defenses in the state court royalties action. a:. 
not, whether the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 [ 
§ 2201, somehow allows Milprint to test a deiei: 
federal court that could, without the Act, on,: 
raised in state court. 
We answer the first que.;tion in the negative .. ~I 
have remarked, the sec:ond count of the con::J 
which asserts something akin to a tral:1 
rescission cause of action, must be disregard1: 
jurisdictional purposes. See n.3 supra. The bala~·· 
the complaint, while it asserts the invalidity o! 
wood's patents, is entirely geared to the royalty a. 
The existence of the license agreements, and a gi 
ized statement of their terms, are alleged, bu: 
nowhere stated that the license has been termi"'' 
either party. In fact, the complaint specifically aid~ 
existence of Curwood's pending state court ;; 
enforce payment of royalties. The relief sought 
• It should be recalled here that 28 U.S.C. § 133&~ 
federal jurisdiction of cases ari~ing under the patr 
1zclusil'e. Absent diversity, the propriety of a stat~ f.'.'.~ 
e.g .• Lear. supra, necessarily 1molies the none~ 1-:· 
federal jurisdiction. Sec Chisum, The Allocatwn QI': 
tio11 bet1('ee11 State and Feifrral Cuurts in Pate11t lil:q 1 
WASH. L. REV. 633, 670 (1970). ' 
-10-
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~o. 77-1049 5 
than a declaration of patent invalidity and of the rights 
of the parties under the license agreement, is specifical-
ly aimed at eliminating l\Iilprint's royalty obligations. 
This is, thus, a quite di ffercnt case than would be 
pn•5ented by a complaint alleging that a licensee's non-
payment of royalties gave it reason to fear the licensor 
would declare a forfeiture and sue for infringement. By 
alleging that Curwood is standing on the license 
agreement, Milprint forecloses that possibility. See 
:lrriu fodu.stries, supra, 510 F.2d at 1073; Thiokol 
Cl1i·111icr1/ Corporation v. H1trliHgton Industries, Inc., 448 
F.2d 1328. 1330 n.2 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
1019 (1972). In fact, the word "infringement" does not 
t'nm appear in the complaint. For purposes of jurisdic-
tion, then, this case is nothing more than Milprint's 
attt'mpt to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to 
t'Stablish a federal defense to an action grounded 
t'Xclusively in state Jaw, which could only be and has 
been brought in state court. 
We believe the attempt must fail. The Act provides, 28 
U.S.C. § 2201, that "[i]n a case of actual controversy 
IC'itlii11 its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States 
... may declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration .... " 
(Emphasis supplied.) By its terms, the Act makes 
d{•claratory judgment jurisdiction dependent on the 
traditional grants of jurisdiction by which conventional 
coercive suits would be judged. 
"[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
procedural only." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 
aoo U.S. 227. 240 [1937]. Congress enlarged the 
range of remedies available in the federal courts 
but did not extend their jurisdiction. 
Skdly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Cu., 339 U.S. 667, 
Iii 1 ( 1!)50). 
In Skdly Oil, the declaratory plaintiff sought to have 
its rhrht to contract performance adjudicated. The 
dcfondants had stated they would not perform because 
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6 No. 771 
the contract was conditioned on the issuance 
F.ederal Power Commission certificate of public •. 1 
nience and necessity to plaintiff. which had. it 11a; J 
not ?~en issued in ti1'.:~· The .. mm plaint ~llegcd ~~.: 1 
cert1f1cate had been issued in time. :\otw1thstc· 
that the time of issuance of the certificate was a :,.'i 
l~w question critical to plaintiff'::; reco\•ery., and tr,,: 
dispute thereon had to be pleaded to establi:;h a li1c 
troversy, the Supreme Court held there was no :t: 
jurisdiction. in accordance with the long-establisn;: 
that the plaintiffs claim must present a federal Q.: 
without reference to anticipated defenses. Id. at 6:~ 
Louisvi'.lle and .Vushvi/le Hailroad Co111pany t'. .\!;' 
211 U.S. 149 (1908). The Court stated: 
To sanction suits for declaratory relief as with1: 
jurisdiction of the District Courts merely bee< 
as in this case, artful pleading anticipates ade: 
based on federal law would contravene the·• 
trend of jurisdictional legislation by Con_ 
disregard the effective functioning of the ft: 
judicial system and distort the limited procec 
11urpose of the Declaratory J udgmcnt Act t 
Developmrnt.~ in the /,riw-D1'claratory J11dq11•.d 
1941·1949. 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 802-03 t19;,. 
339 U.S. at 673-74. 
Here, unlike Skelly Oil, the federal "defen~· 
asserted as the claim of the declaratory p!a1: 
Procedurally, of course, this is part of wha: 
Declaratory Judgment Act is all about. but we th1r.· 
jurisdictional principles should be the same. The~· 
Court apparently agreed. The very portion 01 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW Comment cited appromr.· 
the Court reached the conclusion that a declar; 
action seeking to test a defense should be tria.ble i:. 
federal courts only if it would normally arise in a"' 
to a complaint which itseif would properly ri.; 
federal question. Citing the same Comment. the Co: 
Public Scn·ice Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Cmn;. 
Inc .. 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952), observed that "[w]h<'i 
complaint in an action for declaratory jud~ment '"'' 
essence to assert a defense to an impena1r.; 
-12-
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thm1trned state court action. it is the character of the 
thrl'atened action. and not of the defense, which will 
tll'll•rmine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction 
in the District Court." 
In our opinion the logic of Skelly Oil and W11coff con-
trols this case. It is true, that the Declaratory 
.Jud~mcnt Act does allow cases to be brought in federal 
courts which would not. for lack of a proper coercive 
r1"1111·d11, otherwise be there. But it would be anomalous 
tu con.elude that an Act which provides only proceduml 
and re111cdial flexibility somehow allows a party to 
in\'oke federal question jurisdiction to adjudicate its 
fl•drral defense to an exclusivelv state law action. 
Accordingly, we hold that where d·iversity is lacking, a 
patent licensee's declaratory complaint which asserts 
patent invalidity simply to avoid the obligations of the 
license does not state a claim arising under the patent 
laws within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).5 The 
Third Circuit has flatly so held. Thiokol Chemical 
Cm'Jlflration. supra, 4-18 F.2d 1328, and the Tenth 
Circuit in Product E11yi11eering and Jlan11facturi11g. Inc. 
'" Barnes, 42-1 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1970), while consider-
inJr the jurisdictional issue in conjunction with a 
discretionary dismissal issue much as is presented 
here, with some resulting loss in conceptual clarity, did 
~ Because the importance of respecting jurisdictional limits 
orum leads federal courts to examine their jurisdiction even 
where the parties do not ~uestion it, it mi~ht be argued that 
f.'dwunl Kat:i119a c(). I', (lticru10 .\fe/11/lic .ila1111/n.cturi11q Co .. 
:1:!!1 U.S. 39-1 (19-17), embodies ar. implicit holding tnat a 
lil'l•nsce can invoke federal ;urisdiction to test a federal 
valhlity defense. We think it does not. for three reasons. First. 
thl' dc-claratory plaintiff in Kat::i11!1•·1· had not only ceased 
rornltv pavments but had also terminated the license and 
,;ou~hi declaration not only of invalidity but also of nonin-
Crin~cmcnt. Second. even if this were not so, we doubt that 
:uw such implicit r.nd unconsidered ~holding" survived Skelly 
t>il and ll'w,.//. Third. diversity jurisdiction may, for all that 
app,·ars. have existed in Kntzi11ya. The existence of diversity 
jurisdiction. which is shown by court records but not 
nwntinncd in the 0pinions. exµlains this court's unquestioning 
an·i·ptancl' of Juri-cdi<.:tion in two recent declaratory actions by 
lirl'l\Sl'('~. c · ... .;_l[ C11r1111/'l/fio11 I'. Sta11durrl /'rt'S.<t'tl Sh',./ c(/., 52-1 
F.:!d IU97 (7th Cir. l~l75): and lJn·J.:1111111 J,,.,fr1w11·11ts. /11c. '" 
7i·d111irnl j),.,.,./,,µ111rnl C11r1w1·11tio11. 4:!3 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 
1!1711), n·rt.drnii-d, 401 U.S. 976 (1!171). 
-13-
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8 No. 77: 
expressly affirm the district court's conclusion t>,. 
action virtually identical to this one "was pu;;, 
contract action which properly should be litiga•eJ ,; 
State court." Id. at 43.6 • •• 
We have considered and found without mer:t 
issues raised by l\lilprint including the contention; 
it is an imposition on a ~tate judicial system tor 
its judges to resolve complex issues under federal 
statutes with which they are generally unfamiliar 
that there are potential discovery limitations at the 
forum level. Aside from the fact that we are cog: 
of frequent federal judicial recognitio;i of the co~ru. 
ability of state courts to handle difficult leg"-! qc 
including federal constitutional ones. we are unaw 
any basis in contentions such as those presently· 
for according jurisdiction to a court when thatiu 
tion does not otherwise exist. 
Although our reasons differ from those used~ 
district court, we conclude that the judgrn 
dismissal must be, and it hereby is, 
A true Copy: 
· Teste: 
Clerk of the United States C 
Appeals for the Set'enth C' 
' Indeed. this court has recently indicated the r. 
reach today. In S11pcr Pmrl11ct:; Corporation t'. DP l\a1 
poratio1,, 5·1G F.2d 7~8. 75.1 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976). a cl.le 
ly concerned with the existence of a real case or con1 
it was observed. citing Tlizr,kol, i<11pra. that 
1 
(t]he plaintiffs . stake must be an interest in ! 
111/r111yc111c11t l1t1qatw11 or the threat of such l1u ... 
satisfy the ... jurisdictional requirement thal"" 
arise under the patent law. [Emphasis supplied.) ~ 
USCA ~216-~lidwest Law Prinllnll' Co .. Inc .. Ch1ca~o-~·ll·~ 
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